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Abstract—This paper presents a field study on web security 
vulnerabilities from the programming language type system 
perspective. Security patches reported for a set of 11 widely 
used web applications written in strongly typed languages 
(Java, C#, VB.NET) were analyzed in order to understand the 
fault types that are responsible for the vulnerabilities observed 
(SQL injection and XSS). The results are analyzed and 
compared with a similar work on web applications written 
using a weakly typed language (PHP). This comparison points 
out that some of the types of defects that lead to vulnerabilities 
are programming language independent, while others are 
strongly related to the language used. Strongly typed languages 
do reduce the frequency of vulnerabilities, as expected, but 
there still is a considerable number of vulnerabilities observed 
in the field. The characterization of those vulnerabilities shows 
that they are caused by a small number of fault types. This 
result is relevant to train programmers and code inspectors in 
the manual detection of such faults, and to improve static code 
analyzers to automatically detect the most frequent vulnerable 
program structures found in the field.  
Keywords-Security vulnerabilities; software faults; 
programming languages; field study 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Web applications are frequently deployed with critical 
software bugs that can be maliciously exploited. These 
applications are so widely exposed that existing 
vulnerabilities will most probably be uncovered and 
exploited by hackers. To prevent vulnerabilities, developers 
should apply best coding practices, perform security reviews 
of the code, execute penetration tests, use code vulnerability 
analyzers, etc. However, many times developers focus on the 
implementation of functionalities and on satisfying the user’s 
requirements and disregard security aspects. Additionally, 
numerous developers are not specialized on security and the 
common time-to-market constraints limit an in depth test for 
security vulnerabilities. Knowing the preponderant role of 
web applications in most organizations, one can realize the 
importance of finding ways to reduce the probability of 
deploying applications with security vulnerabilities. 
Software bugs that are responsible for security 
vulnerabilities may have a devastating cost if exploited by 
hackers. Although configuration and human issues are also 
potential causes for vulnerabilities, the root cause of most 
security attacks are vulnerabilities created by software faults. 
Knowing the preponderant role of web applications in most 
organizations, one can realize the importance of finding 
ways to reduce the probability of deploying applications with 
security vulnerabilities.  
Although there are many publications and periodic 
organization reports (e.g., Open Web Application Security 
Project Foundation) showing that web application 
vulnerabilities are a major concern, very few scientific 
studies have been focused on the detailed analysis of the 
fault types behind such vulnerabilities. 
A recent field study [1] analyzed 655 security patches of 
six widely used web applications developed in PHP. The 
types of faults that are most likely to lead to software 
vulnerabilities were characterized, in order to better 
understand the potential relation between software defects 
and security vulnerabilities. Results show that a small subset 
of generic software faults is responsible for almost all the 
security problems studied (essentially, Cross Site Scripting 
(XSS) and SQL injection) and that there is a single fault type 
(Missing Function Call Extended1) that is responsible for 
73% of all the security problems analyzed. 
The problem is that the study presented in [1] is limited 
to web applications written in the PHP language. PHP is a 
dynamically typed language (weak typing) widely used in 
the development of web applications. Although we believe 
that the results from [1] are also valid for other weak typed 
programming languages  (e.g., PERL, CGI), we consider that 
they cannot be applied to languages that use a different type 
system such as Java, C#, and VB.NET. 
In the present work we analyzed 24 widely used open 
source web applications written in statically-typed languages 
(strong typing) in order to understand the most frequent 
types of software faults that lead to web security 
vulnerabilities such as XSS and SQL injection. It is worth 
mentioning that SQL injection and XSS are two of the most 
critical vulnerabilities in web applications [2]. The popularity 
of attacks exploiting these types of vulnerabilities is typically 
related to the easiness in finding and exploiting such 
vulnerabilities, the importance of the assets they can 
disclose, and the level of damage they may inflict. 
All the vulnerabilities reported for the selected 
applications were carefully analyzed in order to understand 
and classify the software fault that made the code vulnerable. 
                                                           
1 The Missing Function Call Extended fault type refers to a vulnerability 
caused by missing the use of a function to clean the values stored in the 
target variable. 
The web applications used in the study are widely used open 
source applications, and some of them are actually used to 
support real business. All applications already have several 
released versions in which software defects were fixed and 
are not newcomers in the field. 
Great care was taken to allow a fair comparison of the 
results between our current study and the previous study for 
PHP applications [1]. The goal is to help understanding 
security vulnerabilities from the point-of-view of the 
language used for the development of the applications.  
The paper is structured as follows: section II presents 
some background in security vulnerabilities in programming 
languages focusing the language type system. Section III 
presents the methodology used in our field study, including 
the description of the applications used and the process 
followed to analyze and classify each vulnerability patch. 
Section IV presents the results and discusses lessons learned, 
and Section V concludes the paper. 
II. SECURITY VULNERABILITIES IN WEB PROGRAMMING 
LANGUAGES 
Many different programming languages are currently 
used in the development of web applications. Ranging from 
proprietary languages (e.g., C# and VB.NET) to open source 
languages (e.g., PHP, CGI, Perl or Java), the spectrum of 
languages available for web development is immense. 
Programming languages can be classified using several 
different taxonomies (e.g., programming paradigm, type 
system, execution mode, generation, etc). The type system, 
particularly important in the context of the present work, 
specifies how data types and data structures are managed and 
constructed by the language, namely how the language maps 
values and expressions into types, how it manipulates those 
types, and how those types interrelate. Based on the type 
system, programming languages can be classified in the 
following way [3]: 
• Typed vs untyped. A typed language defines for 
each operation the applicable data types (e.g., only 
numbers can be divided, only strings can be 
concatenated, dividing a number by a string is not 
possible). On the other hand, an untyped language 
(e.g., assembler) allows any data type to be used in 
any operation. In this case, all data types are 
understood as bits sequences that can be manipulated 
by any operation. 
• Static vs dynamic typed. Static typing implies that 
all expressions must have their types defined before 
execution, typically during compilation (e.g., the 
sum of two integers cannot be stored in a date 
variable; an integer number cannot be passed as a 
parameter to a function that is expecting a string). In 
dynamic typing, operations are analyzed at runtime 
to determine and enforce their type-safety (i.e., types 
are associated based on actual values at runtime 
rather than based on the source code expression 
itself). 
• Weak vs strong typed. In weak typed languages a 
value of one type can be treated as another type (e.g., 
a string can be treated as a number). Strong typed 
languages prevent this situation and an attempt to 
use a wrong type value in a given operation raises an 
exception.  
 
In this work we are particularly interested in 
understanding the impact of the type system in terms of 
security vulnerabilities. This is of particular interest, as many 
critical security vulnerabilities like XSS and SQL Injection 
(see [2] for details on these vulnerabilities) are strongly 
related to the way the language manages data types. For 
example, SQL Injection attacks take advantage of 
improperly validated inputs to change the SQL commands 
that are sent to the database.  
In dynamic typed languages it is sometimes possible to 
inject SQL code by taking advantage of variables that 
supposedly should not be strings (e.g., numbers, dates) as the 
type of the variable is determined based on the assigned 
value. On the other hand, in static typed languages this is not 
possible because the type of variables is determined before 
runtime and the attempt to store a string in a variable of 
another type will raise an error. However, this does not mean 
that SQL injection is not possible in static typed languages. 
In fact, it is indeed possible but only by taking advantage of 
variables of string-type, which reduces the number of 
variables through which a hacker can try to inject SQL code. 
As mentioned before, the field study presented in this 
paper consists in identifying and classifying real security 
vulnerabilities detected and corrected in open source web 
applications developed using static strong typed languages. 
The results were analyzed and compared to the ones 
presented in [1] for PHP (a dynamically-weak typed 
language). The goal was to try to understand if the types of 
defects that lead to vulnerabilities are programming language 
independent. The rest of this paper presents the field study 
approach and the results obtained. 
III. FIELD STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The first step in our study consisted in selecting a set of 
web applications developed using strong typed languages 
and identifying the security vulnerabilities discovered and 
fixed in the different versions of those applications.  
The identified vulnerabilities were analyzed and 
classified using the classification approach proposed in [1]. 
The results were then analyzed and compared to the ones 
presented in that study, in order to identify the impact of the 
language type system in the number and in the type of 
vulnerabilities found in the field. 
A. Applications Studied 
Our target applications were open source and with 
reported security vulnerabilities. The goal was to be sure that 
it was possible to have access to the source code (including 
the code from older versions) in order to be able to analyze 
and understand the security vulnerability and how it was 
fixed. Actually, the way a given vulnerability is fixed is a 
key aspect in the classification of the type of vulnerability. 
This is essential to assure that our classification is orthogonal 
and guarantees a valid comparison with previous studies [1]. 
Typically, a vulnerability can be fixed in more than one way. 
However, it is the way the programmer actually used to fix 
the vulnerability that is considered for its classification. This 
allows us to classify each vulnerability as being of a single 
type.  
As one of our goals was to compare the results from this 
study with the ones presented in [1], we have considered 
primarily web applications from the same domains used in 
that study. This way, we focused our search in the following 
types of applications: Bloggers, Content Management 
Systems (CMS), Forum Software, Issue Tracking, Portals, 
Webmail and Wiki Engines. 
The site “Open Source Software in Java” [4] was 
particularly useful as entry point for the process of 
identifying the web applications for this study, as the most 
representative open source applications written in Java are 
registered and described in this web site.  
After identifying a large set of applications in the 
domains mentioned before, we started searching for security 
vulnerabilities using three well know repositories: Security 
Focus [5], OSVDB [6], and Secunia [7]. Initially, we were 
expecting to identify a large number of vulnerabilities in 
applications developed using this language. However, unlike 
in [1] where six web applications accounted for the 655 
vulnerabilities studied, we found a very low number of 
reported vulnerabilities per application.  
Thus we decided to extend our study to incorporate also 
applications developed using C# and VB.NET (found in the 
“Open Source Software in C#” web site [8]), which have the 
same data type system as Java. Although the total number of 
vulnerabilities identified increased, it still remained quite 
low, at least when comparing to the results presented in [1] 
(see Section IV for details). 
Although we analyzed a total of 24 web applications, we 
were able to find vulnerabilities descriptions for only 11 
applications. This way, our study focused on the following 
set of applications with reported vulnerabilities (see more 
details on this on section IV.C): JForum [9], OpenCMS [10], 
BlojSom [11], Roller WebLogger [12], JSPWiki [13], 
SubText [14], DotNetNuke [15], YetAnotherForum [16], 
BugTracker .NET [17], Deki Wiki [18], ScrewTurn Wiki 
[19]. 
It is important to reemphasize that many of these 
applications are widely used, including in the support of real 
businesses. All applications already have several released 
versions and are not newcomers to the field. 
B. Patch Analysis and Vulnerability Classification 
For all the applications analyzed, we collected the source 
code of both the vulnerable version and the patched version. 
By comparing these two versions we could understand the 
vulnerability and classify what code has been changed to 
correct it. 
To gather information on the security patches (including 
source code) we used mirror websites, sites with source 
code, online reviews, news sites, sites related to security, 
changelog files of the application, the version control system 
repository, etc. Finding the source code of old versions is 
usually a very difficult task that requires searching in 
different sources. However, for the purpose of this study, we 
only needed the original piece of code and the piece of the 
code that corrected the vulnerability (i.e., the source code of 
the entire application is not required). The two main types of 
sources used were: 
• The version control system repository: most of the 
applications analyzed have their source code 
completely available through SVN or CVS servers 
that are publicly accessible. 
• The web site of the application: some of the 
applications had all the versions available in their 
web sites, ready for download. 
 
Once the source code was obtained, a differential 
analysis was performed to identify the locations in the code 
where the faults were fixed. This operation was done through 
the use of diff tools and manual analysis of the code. 
The software faults that generated the detected 
vulnerabilities were classified using the classification 
approach proposed in [1]. Table I summarizes the fault types 
considered. It is important to emphasize that the fault types 
in Table I are used in this paper as reference for the fault 
classification. These types of faults are simply the most 
common types of faults observed in [1] and are not discussed 
in this paper in the context of strong/weak typing language. 
They are simply used as starting point for fault classification. 
To allow meaningful comparison between both studies, 
the guidelines for classifying the security vulnerabilities 
were exactly the same ones used in [1], namely: 
1. When the patch can fix both XSS and SQL Injection 




TABLE I.  FAULT TYPES CLASSIFICATION 
Fault type Description 
MFC Missing function call 
MFC extended Missing function call returning the same data type as the argument 
MVIV Missing variable initialization using a value 
MIA Missing if construct around statements 
MIFS Missing if construct plus statements 
MIEB Missing if construct plus statements plus else before statements 
MLPA Missing small and localized part of the algorithm 
WPFV Wrong variable used in parameter of function call 
WLEC Wrong logical expression used as branch condition 
EFC Extraneous function call 
2. It is assumed that the information publicly disclosed 
in specialized sites is accurate and that the fix made 
by the programmer of the patch and made available 
by the provider that develops the web application 
solves the stated problem. 
3. To correct a single vulnerability several code 
changes may be necessary and they are counted as 
several vulnerabilities. All the changes will be 
considered as a series of singular fault type fixes. For 
example, suppose that two functions are needed to 
properly sanitize a variable. Missing any of these 
functions makes the application vulnerable, so both 
of them must be taken into account. 
4. When a particular code change corrects immediately 
several vulnerabilities, each one is considered as a 
singular fix. 
5. A security vulnerability may affect several versions 
of the application but the fix is accounted only for 
one. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The goal of this practical experience report is to report a 
field study focusing on SQL Injection and XSS 
vulnerabilities in web applications developed using strong 
typed languages. We analyzed and classified the faults the 
lead to these two types of vulnerabilities, using the 
methodology presented above. The field study was agnostic 
concerning the types of faults; that is, we simple classified 
all faults (that originated SQL Injection and XSS 
vulnerabilities) reported for the open source applications 
presented in Section III.A and we did not focus on selecting 
a specific subtype of faults (e.g., faults related to the 
strong/weak typing aspects). In other words, the goal is not 
to analyze only faults strictly related to the strong/weak 
typing features, but to provide a field study on faults reported 
in applications written in strong typed languages and 
compare the results (i.e., all faults observed) with the 
observations of [1]. 
We have collected and classified 60 XSS and SQL 
Injection security vulnerabilities, distributed over 11 
different web applications.  XSS is the most frequent type of 
vulnerability observed in our sample, accounting for 68.33% 
of the vulnerabilities analyzed, while SQL Injection 
corresponds to 31.67% (see Fig. 1). Comparing this result 
with the distribution observed in [1] for web applications 
written using a weakly-typed language, we can conclude that 
the distribution is similar. In fact, the distribution observed in 
[1] was 70% for XSS against 29.47% for SQL Injection. 
This result also confirms different CVE reports [2][20] that 
point out XSS as the most frequent type of web security 
vulnerability. 
The detailed distribution of vulnerabilities by fault types 
is presented in Fig. 2. As shown, the most frequent fault type 
was MFC Extended, which corresponds to a missing 
function call returning the same data type as the argument. 




Figure 2.  Vulnerabilities fault type summary 
 
This fault type is normally associated to the use of a function 
responsible for the sanitization of an input. For example, in 
ScrewTurn Wiki, the code: 
 
user = user.Replace("\r","").Replace("\n",""); 
 
 
was replaced by: 
 
user = Sanitize(user); 
 
 
This fault type is the most frequent one because the 
majority of vulnerabilities are due to inputs not validated or 
not properly sanitized, and so, the obvious fix is to 
implement functions that simply clean and validate the input 
received from the user. Another interesting fact is that most 
of these fixes are related to XSS vulnerabilities, which by 
definition are prone to this kind of error.  
A. Strong Typing vs Weak Typing 
Table II shows the fault types responsible for the 
vulnerabilities observed in our current field study on web 
applications written in statically typed languages (strong 
typing) and the results of the previous study on dynamically 
typed languages (weak typing).  
The MFC extended (Missing Function Call extended) 
type of software fault is clearly the main cause of web 
application vulnerabilities, no mater the type system of the 
programming language used (63.33% of the faults in our 
current study and 75.87% in the previous study [1]). In other 
words, the occurrence of MFC extended software faults 
seems independent from the type system of the programming 
language used. However, nothing can be concluded 
regarding language independence, as we do not have enough 
data to confirm that. 
The MFC extended type of fault is also responsible for 
both SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities, although its 
prevalence in XSS is even more evident (82.93% in strong 
typed languages and 77.27% in weak typed). 
Looking at the results presented in Table II, the big 
differences between weak typing and strong typing concern 
the faults classified in second and third place, MIEB 
(Missing if construct plus statements plus else before 
statements) and MFC (Missing function call). While in weak 
typed applications, the second and third positions were 
WPFV (Wrong variable used in parameter of function call) 
and MIFS (Missing if construct plus statements), in our 
study we have found for these positions the MIEB and MFC 
fault types.  
MIEB shows that the fixes were not only based on the 
introduction of an “if” statement, which would correspond to 
the MIFS found in the weak typed. This kind of fix can be 
interpreted in two ways: (i) there were some more complex 
algorithm steps to be performed or (ii) the team was more 
conservative and followed the best practices 
recommendations that state the need for having complete 
“if” and “else” statements [21][22]. This is currently 
accepted as good practice when working with strong typed 
languages and explains why the MIEB appears in second 
place, against the third place for MIFS in the weak typed 
applications. 
Another major difference lays in the fact that WPFV 
(Wrong variable used in parameter of function call) 
represents only 3.33% in the current study, while in the weak 
TABLE II.  DISTRIBUTION OF FAULT TYPES PER VULNERABILITIES 
Strong type (Java, C#, VB.Net) Weak dynamic type (PHP) [1] 
Fault type #  
Faults 
SQL Inj.  
(%) 
XSS  
(%) SQL + XSS (%) 
#  
Faults 
SQL Inj.  
(%) 
XSS  
(%) SQL + XSS (%) 
MFC Ext 38 21.05% 82.93% 63.33% 497 72.54% 77.27% 75.88% 
MIEB 6 26.32% 2.44% 10.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
MFC 4 15.79% 2.44% 6.67% 4 0.52% 0.65% 0.61% 
MIFS 3 15.79% 0.00% 5.00% 34 6.22% 4.76% 5.19% 
MLPA 2 5.26% 2.44% 3.33% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
WPFV 2 10.53% 0.00% 3.33% 46 17.10% 2.81% 7.02% 
WLEC 2 5.26% 2.44% 3.33% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
MVIV 1 0.00% 2.44% 1.67% 9 0.52% 1.73% 1.37% 
MIA 1 0.00% 2.44% 1.67% 2 0.00% 0.43% 0.31% 
EFC 1 0.00% 2.44% 1.67% 6 0.52% 1.08% 0.92% 
MVAE 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
MLAC 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9 1.04% 1.52% 1.37% 
MVAV 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
WVAV 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 28 1.04% 5.63% 4.27% 
WFCS 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 18 0.52% 3.68% 2.75% 
MLOC 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 0.00% 0.22% 0.15% 
WAEP 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
ELOC 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 0.00% 0.22% 0.15% 
Total 60 100% 100% 100% 655 100% 100% 100% 
typed applications [1] it represents 7.02%, being the second 
most frequent fault type. This shows that the number of 
programming faults resulting in the use of wrong variables in 
strong typed languages (our current study) is lower than the 
one observed in weak typed, suggesting that the main 
problems are due to inputs not correctly/completely sanitized 
and not caused by the use of wrong variables in the 
algorithm.  
This can be linked to the fact that, by definition, in strong 
typed languages, a variable has a predefined type of data, 
while in weakly typed one variable can handle different 
types of data, especially in dynamic typed languages like 
PHP (the one used in [1]). This means that even when the 
programmer uses a variable of a wrong type, the mistake will 
not be detected at compile time in weak typed languages. 
However, in strong typed languages, the programmer needs 
to use a variable declared for that specific type of data and 
so, the probability of using wrong variables is much lower. 
B. Vulnerability Analysis: XSS & SQL Injection 
Looking at XSS column in Table II we can see that the 
most frequent fault type is MFC extended, with a percentage 
of 82.93%. This can be explained by the fact that the most 
important way of exploiting this vulnerability is through the 
input of special data into the application. So, if the 
application has a way to sanitize and validate this input, the 
vulnerability will not be present anymore. Also, in the 
majority of cases, this kind of fault type was fixed by the 
introduction of a sanitizing function, to clean up the input 
received from the user. 
Concerning the SQL Injection vulnerability, we can see 
in Table II that vulnerabilities have been caused by different 
types of faults, as we have not observed the preponderance 
of a single type of software fault (as was the case for XSS). 
The most frequent fault type that causes SQL injection 
vulnerabilities is MIEB with 26.32%, followed by MFC 
Extended with 21.05%. This shows that the lack of input 
sanitization is not the most frequent problem. The fix of this 
kind of security vulnerabilities must be done not only by 
sanitizing the user input but also by the verification of other 
application states, through the introduction of “if… else…” 
statements. 
C. Lessons Learned 
From the results discussed in the previous two sections, 
we can summarize the main differences observed in 
vulnerabilities found in the field in applications written with 
strong typed and weak typed languages.  
The first difference comes right from the number of 
detected security vulnerabilities. While in [1], the authors 
identified 655 security vulnerabilities in only 6 applications; 
in this study we identified 60 security vulnerabilities in 11 
applications, taken from an initial set of 24 web applications. 
That is, we could not find any recorded vulnerability for 13 
of the web applications analyzed.  Obviously, this does not 
mean that these 13 applications have not had vulnerabilities 
fixed: we just could not find any vulnerability description 
recorded for these applications.  
The general reading of these results is that strong typed 
languages do contribute to decrease the frequency of SQL 
injection and XSS vulnerabilities in application code. In fact, 
the strong typed languages, which, by definition have 
variables defined for a specific type, make the use of wrong 
variables less probable. But strong typed languages, by 
themselves, do not eliminate the need to validate and sanitize 
all the inputs from the user, in order to avoid the introduction 
of executable instructions (XSS) or SQL queries (SQL 
Injection). This is clearly corroborated by our field results, as 
we still can find vulnerabilities in web applications written in 
strong typed languages. 
Another interesting analysis can be made based on the 
age of the applications. The majority of the vulnerabilities 
that we analyzed were identified after 2005. By this time, the 
concern about XSS and SQL Injection vulnerabilities was 
already disseminated throughout the world, which can be 
confirmed by the publication of several studies in this area 
[23][24][25][26][27]. So, when the analyzed applications 
were implemented, the technical community was already 
concerned about these problems, and could start addressing it 
earlier in the application development roadmap. The fact that 
we can still find a significant number of vulnerabilities 
reported in the field shows that producing secure code is far 
from being trivial. 
The results presented in this paper also show an 
important feature: the vulnerabilities found in the field are 
not caused by a large diversity of software fault types. On the 
contrary, there is a small set of fault types that is responsible 
for most of the vulnerabilities, as already observed in section 
IV. This fact can be used to train programmers, focusing 
their attention on the correct treatment of the program 
structures related to the most frequent types of faults. 
Additionally, the knowledge of the most common types of 
software faults that lead to SQL injection and XSS 
vulnerabilities can also be useful to improve effectiveness of 
code inspections, as the inspection team will be aware of the 
fact that most vulnerabilities are caused by a small number of 
faulty program structures. 
Static code analyzes tools can also benefit from the 
identification of the most common types of faults observed 
in our field study, as the tools can be optimized to improve 
detection of such vulnerabilities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we analyzed open source web applications, 
written with strong typed languages (Java, C# and VB.NET) 
focusing on security vulnerabilities. For this analysis, we 
used the methodology presented in [1]. Comparing the 
results from the two studies, we can conclude that the use of 
strong typed languages does influence security 
vulnerabilities. Applications written with strong typed 
languages seem to have a smaller number of reported 
vulnerabilities.  
In this study we found 60 vulnerabilities in 11 
applications, while in [1] the authors found 655 in 6 
applications. We can also state that the fault types identified 
in both studies belong to a narrow list, which points a path to 
improve web applications, namely in the context of code 
inspections and the use of tools for static analysis [28].  
This study also showed that the way the programmers 
fixed the reported vulnerabilities has some differences, 
depending on the language used. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Fonseca, J., Vieira, M.: “Mapping Software Faults with Web Security 
Vulnerabilities”, IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable 
Systems and Networks (DSN 2008), Anchorage, Alaska, USA, June, 
2008 
[2] Stock, A., Williams, J., Wichers, D., “OWASP top 10”, OWASP 
Foundation, July, 2007 
[3] Tomatis, N., Brega, R., Rivera, G., Siegwart, R., "May you have a 
strong (-typed) foundation, Why strong-typed programming 
languages do matter”, IEEE International Conference on Robotics 
and Automation, New Orleans, LA, USA, April 26-May 1, 2004 
[4] Open Source Software in Java, December, 2008, http://java-
source.net/  
[5] Security Focus, December, 2008, http://www.securityfocus.com/ 
[6] OSVDB: The Open Source Vulnerability Database, December, 2008, 
http://osvdb.org 
[7] Secunia, December, 2008, http://secunia.com 
[8] Open Source Software in C#, December, 2008, http://csharp-
source.net/ 
[9] JForum, December, 2008, http://www.jforum.net/ 
[10] OpenCMS from Alkacon Software, December 10th, 2008, 
http://www.opencms.org/  
[11] BlojSom, December, 2008, 
http://wiki.blojsom.com/wiki/display/blojsom3/About+blojsom 
[12] The Roller WebLogger, December, 2008, 
http://rollerweblogger.org/project/ 
[13] JSPWiki, December, 2008, http://www.jspwiki.org/ 
[14] SubText, December, 2008, http://subtextproject.com/ 
[15] DotNetNuke, December, 2008, http://www.dotnetnuke.com/   
[16] YetAnotherForum, December, 2008, http://www.yetanotherforum.net/ 
[17] BugTracker .NET, December, 2008, 
http://www.ifdefined.com/bugtrackernet.html 
[18] Deki Wiki, December, 2008, http://wiki.developer.mindtouch.com/ 
[19] ScrewTurn Wiki, December, 2008, 
http://www.screwturn.eu/Default.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSuppor
t=1 
[20] Steve, C., Martin, R., ” Vulnerability Type Distributions in CVE”, 
Mitre report, May, 2007 
[21] C# Coding Standards and Best Practices, December 2008, 
http://www.codeproject.com/KB/cs/c__coding_standards.aspx  
[22] C# Coding Standards and Best Programming Practices, December 
2008, http://www.dotnetspider.com/tutorials/BestPractices.aspx 
[23] Valeur, F., Mutz, D., Vigna, G.: “A Learning-Based Approach to the 
Detection of SQL Attacks”, IEEE Conference on Detection of 
Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA 2005), 
Vienna, Austria, July, 2005 
[24] Christey, S., “Unforgivable Vulnerabilities”, Black Hat Briefings, 
2007 
[25] Zanero, S., Carettoni, L., Zanchetta, M., “Automatic Detection of 
Web Application Security Flaws”, Black Hat Briefings, 2005 
[26] David, P., Stroud, R., “Conceptual Model and Architecture of 
MAFTIA”, LAAS-CNRS, 2003 
[27] Jovanovic, N., Kruegel, C., Kirda, E., “Precise Alias Analysis for 
Static Detection of Web Application Vulnerabilities”, IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2006 
[28] Nagy, C., Mancoridis, S., "Static security analysis based on input-
related software faults", 13th European Conference on Software 
Maintenance and Reengineering (CSMR'09), Kaiserslautern, 
Germany, March, 2009 
 
   
